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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Dwayne A. Bradley appeals from the judgment of conviction imposed upon the 
jury's verdicts finding him guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The following facts are derived from the testimony presented at Bradley's jury 
trial: 
Sergeant Eric Hildebrandt of the Kootenai County Sherriff's Department was the 
supervisor of the Kootenai County Drug Task Force, and commonly used confidential 
informants to buy drugs from persons suspected of selling drugs. (Tr., p.99, L.2 - p.100, 
L.22.) The prosecutor asked Sergeant Hildebrandt whether, based on his experience in 
the local area, he had "come to be familiar with various terms that are associated with 
the buying and selling of methamphetamine?" and he said that he had. (Tr., p.101, 
Ls.20-23.) The sergeant further testified that, in his experience in the local area, instead 
of speaking plainly about what amounts of drugs were being discussed, buyers and 
sellers of methamphetamine would say "whole one" or "full one" to specify a full ounce. 
(Tr., p.101, L.24 - p.102, L.20.) 
One of the confidential informants used by the drug task force, Robert Wyman, 
cooperated with Sergeant Hildebrandt on February 6, 2013, by arranging to "buy" one 
ounce of methamphetamine from Bradley, who was known as "Cecil." (Tr., p.107, L.5 -
p. 108, L.10.) Wyman made two phone calls on his phone from the sheriff's office, 
which were recorded by Sergeant Hildebrandt with a pocket digital recorder and also 
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through the sheriff's department detective system. (Tr., p.108, Ls.2-24; p.110, Ls.4-15.) 
During both phone calls, Wyman and Sergeant Hildebrandt were in the interview room. 
(Tr., p.108, Ls.18-21; p.110, Ls.4-12.) 
In the first phone call, Wyman asked Bradley if they could meet, and Bradley said 
they could. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1; 00:00-00:18.) Wyman then said, "Okay ... I need a 
whole one," and Bradley responded "okay." (Id.; 00:18-00:22) The two men agreed to 
meet in the Hayden area around 1 :00 that afternoon. (Id.; 00:37-00:45) At the end of 
the call, Bradley told Wyman to "just get a hold of me and I'll let you know if I'm out that 
direction." (Id.; 00:57-01 :02) After the first call, Wyman waited about 30 to 45 minutes 
and called Bradley again. (Tr., p.110, Ls.4-8.) During that call, Bradley and Wyman 
agreed to meet in the "Pawn 1" area. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2; 00:26-00:40.) After Wyman 
and Bradley agreed to meet each other in 15 minutes, Bradley blurted out, "hey -- do 
you want it full?" (Id.; 00:50-00:55.) Wyman answered, "yeah, yeah," and Bradley said, 
"alright, see ya there." (Id.; 00:56-00:57) The call ended with Wyman saying "ok" and 
Bradley saying "bye." (Id.; 00:58-00:59.) 
Kootenai County Sheriff's Detective 1 Mark Ellis testified that he was working that 
day as a member of the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force, which is tasked with 
working drug-level cases of trafficking and dealing drugs, and other serious felony 
cases. (Tr., p.115, L.22 - p.116, L.2.) On February 6, 2013, Detective Ellis met with 
Sergeant Hildebrandt and Wyman, then drove to Pawn 1 and, after waiting 15 minutes, 
observed a blue pickup truck get pulled over by two patrol deputies. (Tr., p.116, L.7 -
1 Although Ellis initially identified himself as a "deputy" sheriff (Tr., p.115, Ls.17-19), 
inasmuch as the prosecutor referred to Ellis as "Detective Ellis" (Tr., p.136, Ls.21-23), 
the state will do likewise. 
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p.117, L.16.) The deputies had Bradley, the only person in the truck, get out, and they 
detained him in handcuffs. (Tr., p.117, L. 17-p.118, L.11.) 
Detective Ellis searched the pickup truck Bradley had driven to the Pawn 1 area 
and found an aerosol can with an "obviously fake bottom," which held a clear plastic 
bag with a white crystal substance inside that was subsequently determined by Ann 
Nord of the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab to be 27.63 grams of methamphetamine --
just short of 28.35 grams for one ounce. (Tr., p.119, L.19 - p.120, L.11; p.125, L.21 -
p.126, L.1; p.144, L.9 - p.146, L.20). Detective Ellis also found four cell phones in the 
pickup truck driven by Bradley, and $853 cash in Bradley's wallet -- mostly in $20 bills. 
(Tr., p.121, L.18-p.122, L.11.) 
The state charged Bradley with trafficking in methamphetamine, based on the 
allegation that he "did knowingly possess and/or was in actual and/or constructive 
possession of twenty-eight (28) grams or more of methamphetamine .... " (R., pp.63-
64.) Bradley filed a motion to dismiss for lack of sufficient evidence at the preliminary 
hearing, which, after the submission of briefs and a hearing, was denied. (R., pp.94-
106, 109-11 0; see generally Tr., pp.6-15.) Prior to trial, the district court granted the 
state's motion to amend the Information to allege Bradley "did knowingly possess 
methamphetamine ... in an amounted [sic] represented to be twenty-eight (28) grams 
or more .... " (R., pp.112, 131-134 (emphasis added).) At the end of the presentation 
of evidence, Bradley verbally moved, under I.C.R. 29, for a judgment of acquittal, asking 
that the case be dismissed on the same grounds as his earlier motion to dismiss, and 
the court denied the motion. (Tr., p.151, L.23 - p.152, L.20.) The jury found Bradley 
guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., p.171.) 
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Bradley filed a motion for a new trial, alleging, inter alia, the audio recordings of 
the phone calls between Bradley and Wyman "were admitted contrary to the Rules of 
Evidence[,]" and "the verdict is not sustainable under the evidence presented." (R., 
pp.174-175.) After a hearing (see generally Tr., pp.191-198), the district court entered a 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for a New Trial (R., 
pp.183-202). The court sentenced Bradley to a unified 12-year sentence with three 
years fixed. (R., pp.213-215.) Bradley timely appealed. (R., pp.207-208, 242-247.) 
4 
ISSUES 
Bradley states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted the audio 
recordings of the telephone calls into evidence, because the State 
did not provide proper foundation to admit them? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bradley's oral Idaho 
Criminal Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, because the 
evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to convict him of 
trafficking in methamphetamine? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified 
sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Bradley 
following his conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The State rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Bradley failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in overruling 
Bradley's foundation objection to the admission of the two audiotaped phone calls? 
2. Has Bradley failed to establish the trial court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion for 
judgment of acquittal? 
3. Has Bradley failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing a unified sentence of 12 years with three years fixed upon his conviction for 




Bradley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Overruling 
Bradley's Foundation Objection To The Admission Of The Two Recorded Phone Calls 
A. Introduction 
Bradley contends that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his 
foundation objection to the admission of two recordings of the telephone calls between 
Mr. Wyman and Bradley. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-12.) Bradley has failed to show error 
because a review of the record reveals that the state presented adequate foundation for 
the evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence 
and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only when there has been 
a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731-732, 24 P.3d 44, 
48-49 (2001); State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436,438 (2005). 
C. The State Laid Proper Foundation For Admission Of The Recordings Of The Two 
Phone Calls 
Foundation for evidence Is governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 901, which 
provides: 
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
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I.R.E. 901 (a). The foundation requirements can be met through "[t]estimony of a 
witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be." I.R.E. 901 (b)(1 ). The 
Idaho Supreme Court recently summarized: 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence require "authentication or 
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility," which "is satisfied 
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is 
what its proponent claims." I.R.E. 901 (a). Rule 901 (b) contains an 
illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of suggested methods of identification, 
such as "[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is 
claimed to be" or examination of the evidence's "distinctive characteristics 
and the like," including "[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal 
patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with 
circumstances." I.R.E. 901 (b)(1 ), (4). Whether there is a proper 
foundation upon which to admit evidence is a matter within the trial court's 
discretion. Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 
761, 770, 264 P.3d 400, 409 (2011 ). 
State v. Koch, 2014 WL 4388618 *5 (Idaho) (currently not released for publication, and 
subject to revision or withdrawal). 
In this case, prior to the admission of the two audio recordings of the telephone 
calls between Wyman and Bradley (Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2), the state first elicited 
testimony from Sergeant Hildebrandt, who facilitated and recorded the phone calls. 
(Tr., p.108, L.2 - p.110, L.21.) Sergeant Eric Hildebrandt testified: 
(1) the phone calls were made on Wyman's phone and recorded with a 
pocket digital recorder and also through the sheriffs department 
detective system (Tr., p.108, Ls.11-17); 
(2) Wyman and Sergeant Hildebrandt were in the interview room of the 
detective's division during both phone calls (Tr., p.108, Ls.18-21; 
p.110, Ls.4-12); 
(3) the first phone call lasted "[p]robably a minute, maybe a little 
longer" (Tr., p.108, L.25-p.109, L.1); 
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(4) Sergeant Hildebrandt was present and listened the entire time 
when Wyman was speaking during the first phone call (Tr., p.109, 
Ls.2-7); 
(5) Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is an accurate DVD recording of the first 
conversation Wyman engaged in (Tr., p.109, Ls.8-22); 
(6) Sergeant Hildebrandt recognized one of the two voices heard in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 as Wyman's voice (Tr., p.109, L.24 - p.110, L.3); 
(7) the second call was made by Wyman about "[h]alf an hour, 45 
minutes later" in the same room, and Sergeant Hildebrandt took the 
same steps to record the conversation he had taken for the first call 
(Tr., p.110, Ls.4-15); 
(8) Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 is "an accurate recording of the conversation" 
that Sergeant Hildebrandt listened to during the second phone call 
by Wyman, and it lasted "about 45 seconds to a minute" (Tr., p.110, 
L.16-p.111, L.2); 
(9) In regard to Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Sergeant Hildebrandt recognized 
one of the two voices as Wyman's voice (Tr., p.111, Ls.3-7); 
(10) During cross-examination, Sergeant Hildebrandt stated he could 
"hear part of what was being said on the other end of the line, but 
[he] couldn't hear every word," and acknowledged that he didn't 
clearly "hear the entire both sides of the conversation at the time 
the conversation was being made" (Tr., p.113, L.18- p.114, L.16.) 
Detective Mark Ellis testified that he had the opportunity to speak to Bradley after 
Bradley was pulled over near Pawn 1 by law enforcement, and came to recognize 
Bradley's voice. (Tr., p.117, L.5 - p.119, L.1.) Detective Ellis listened to the phone calls 
recorded in Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2, and recognized the two voices in the 
conversations as belonging to Dwayne Bradley and Robert Wyman. (Tr., p.119, Ls.2-
13.) 
The combined testimony of Sergeant Hildebrandt and Detective Ellis constituted 
sufficient foundation to admit the audio recordings of the two phone calls because it 
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clearly supported a finding that the recordings were "what its proponent claims." I.RE. 
901 (a). After the prosecutor summarized how the two recordings were properly 
authenticated, the district court embraced his analysis, as seen in the following colloquy: 
[Prosecutor]: Well, Judge, the evidence that you had from Eric 
Hildebrandt was that he was there for the entire conversation, both 1 and 
2, with Mr. Wyman and that he recognized the voice of Mr. Wyman. The 
evidence from Detective Ellis was that he recognized both voices, Mr. 
Wyman and Mr. Bradley's voice. I think that's plenty of evidence to 
establish the authenticity of those two exhibits. And any argument that 
counsel has I think would go to the weight rather than towards the 
evidence. 
THE COURT: All right. Further, Detective Hildebrandt was able to hear at 
least part of Mr. -- what was represented as Mr. Bradley's confirmation. I 
find there is sufficient foundation between the two officers to establish the 
authenticity and the completeness of the record. The objection is 
overruled. 
(Tr., p.136, L.18 - p.137, L.8.) The district court correctly concluded that, based upon 
Sergeant Hildebrandt's and Detective EIiis's testimony, the state provided proper 
authentication to admit the two recordings of the phone conversations between Bradley 
and Wyman. 
On appeal, Bradley contends that because Sergeant Hildebrandt stated he did 
not clearly hear every word uttered by Bradley's side of the conversation during the 
phone calls, "the State did not show that the recordings were complete and accurate 
representations, [and] it did not sufficiently authenticate the recordings." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.11-12.) Bradley's insistence that someone must be able to testify that they 
listened to every word of both sides of a recorded phone conversation as it occurred in 
order to authenticate such recording under I.RE. 901 is incorrect. 
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Bradley has presented no authority actually supporting his contention that a 
witness must testify to contemporaneously hearing both sides of a recorded phone 
conversation in order to authenticate such a recording. The few discernible cases that 
touch on this issue appear to hold otherwise. In Chavis v. Wise, 2013 WL 3287104 *9 
(M.D. Ala. 2013) (emphasis added), the federal district court considered a similar 
situation and argument, explaining: 
. . . Officer Robinson then testified that the tape played at the hearing was 
the tape he made at the police station, that the recording equipment was 
in working order, and that the tape was a true and accurate recording of 
the conversation between J.M.W. and Chavis. During cross-examination, 
Officer Robinson acknowledged that he could hear only J.M. W. 's side of 
the conversation as the tape was being made. Therefore, Chavis says, 
Officer Robinson could not properly testify that the tape was an accurate 
recording of the conversation. 
In Molina v. State, 533 So.2d 701, 711 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988), this 
Court [sic] addressed the issue whether a videotape of a telephone call 
made by the defendant could be admissible if the police officer who was 
present at the time the videotape was made and called upon at trial to 
verify the tape "really wasn't paying that much attention to what [the 
defendant] was saying" because he was busy with other work. The officer 
was able to testify, however, that he did hear the defendant speaking "and 
was aware of the general tenor of the conversation." Id . ... 
The Molina Court held that the officer's testimony was sufficient to 
authenticate the tape. "Although he could not verify every word that the 
defendant uttered as one he personally heard, when 'portions of the tape's 
film and sound [are] verified by an eyewitness,' the videotape is 
admissible. United States v. Bynum, 567 F.2d 1167, 1177 (1 st Cir. 1978). 
Since the defendant made no argument that the tape was inaccurate or 
had been altered, [the officer's] verification of the parts of the tape he 
heard was sufficient. See Louis Vuitton, S.A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp., 
765 F. 2d 966, 974 (2d Cir. 1985)." Molina, 533 So.2d at 711 (emphasis 
supplied in Molina); see also Ex parte Fuller, 620 So.2d 675 (Ala.1993) 
(The party offering the recording must present sufficient evidence to meet 
the 'reliable representation' standard. In other words, the witness must 
testify that he or she has sufficient personal knowledge of the sounds 
recorded and that the tape accurately and reliably represents the actual 
scene or sounds.). 
10 
In this case, Officer Robinson was able to verify that those portions 
of the audiotape depicting what he could hear during the conversation 
were accurate. Chavis made no claim that the tape was inaccurate or had 
been altered in any way. Accordingly, Officer Robinson's testimony 
regarding the accuracy and authenticity of the tape were sufficient to allow 
the tape to be admitted into evidence. 
See Koch, 2014 WL 4388618 *5 ("Because Idaho Rule of Evidence 901 is based on 
Federal Rule of Evidence 901, how other jurisdictions have interpreted the federal rule's 
requirements with regard to the admission of emails and text messages is instructive in 
this case."). 
The same is true in Bradley's case. Although Sergeant Hildebrandt could not 
hear every word on Bradley's side of the phone conversations, he testified he was 
present and heard all of Wyman's side of the conversations and that the recordings 
were accurate. As in Chavis, because Bradley has "made no claim that the tape[s 
were] inaccurate or had been altered in any way," Chavis, 2013 WL 3287104 *9, the 
officers' combined testimony provided sufficient authenticity to allow the tapes to be 
admitted into evidence. See Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp., 765 F.2d 
966, 974 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating in reference to F.R.E. 901 (a), "[w]here, as here, no well-
founded accusation of impropriety or inaccuracy is made, testimony as to authentication 
is sufficient"); United States v. Rengifo, 789 F.2d 975 (1 st Cir. 1986) ("This circuit does 
not require that the witness authenticating tape recorded conversations be someone 
who either participated in or personally overheard the subject matter of the recording in 
evidence."); State v. Shepherd, 2012 WL 5877553 **6-7 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.) (recorded 
jail phone call between defendant and his brother was authenticated by victim's "voice" 
identification; "the state was not required to 'prove beyond any doubt that the evidence 
11 
is what it purports to be[,]' ... [but needs] only to demonstrate a 'reasonable likelihood' 
that the recording was authentic"). 
Bradley has failed to provide authority to support his claim that, unless Sergeant 
Hildebrandt could testify that he heard every word uttered on the other end of the phone 
conversations between Bradley and Wyman, there could not be a sufficient foundation 
for admission of the recordings. Moreover, Bradley has failed to provide any viable 
reason to doubt that the two recordings were anything other than what the prosecution 
claimed they were -- recordings of the two phone conversations between Bradley and 
Wyman made at Sergeant Hildebrandt's request and under his monitoring. See State v. 
Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 901 (a) indicates that the purpose of the authentication requirement is to show 
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims."); see also Rengifo, 789 F.2d 
at 978 (quoting United States v. Cortellesso, 663 F.2d 361, 364 (1 st Cir. 1981)), and 
United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1976)) ("Tapes are not 
inadmissible merely because "one can conjure up hypothetical possibilities that 
tampering occurred."). 
The state laid adequate foundation for the admission of the audio recordings of 
the two telephone calls between Wyman and Bradley. Bradley has therefore failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. 
Finally, Bradley contends that, because the district court admitted the two 
recordings of the telephone conversations between himself and Wyman (Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 1 and 2) into evidence without proper authentication, the court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion for a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406. (See Appellant's 
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Brief, pp.14-16; R., pp.183-202; Tr., p.191, L.2 - p.193, L.12.) Based on the above 
reasoning and authority, Bradley has failed to show any abuse of discretion by the 
district court's denial of his motion for a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406. 
11. 
Bradley Has Failed To Establish The Trial Court Erred In Denying His Rule 29 Motion 
For Judgment Of Acquittal 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Bradley contends the trial court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion 
for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's evidence for the alleged failure of the 
state to provide sufficient evidence to establish that he represented the weight of the 
methamphetamine as 28 grams or more. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-21.) Because there 
was substantial evidence presented at trial from which a jury could reasonably conclude 
that Bradley represented he would deliver one ounce of methamphetamine to Wyman, 
Bradley's argument fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In an appeal from the denial of an I.C.R. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, 
the issue presented is whether there was substantial and competent evidence to 
support a guilty verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. 
App. 1997). An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285-86, 77 P.3d 956, 974-75 (2003); State v. Reyes, 121 
Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). The appellate court will not substitute its view 
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for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the 
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. 
Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 683-84, 99 P.3d 1069, 1073-74 (2004) (plurality); State v. 
Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Decker, 108 
Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). 
In determining if the evidence is substantial and competent, it will be considered 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 
P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. 
Substantial evidence is present when a "reasonable mind" could conclude that guilt was 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Hoyle, 140 Idaho at 683-684, 99 P.3d at 1073-
1074. 
C. There Was Sufficient Evidence Presented For The Jury To Reasonably Conclude 
That Bradley Represented He Would Deliver One Ounce Of Methamphetamine 
To Wyman 
Bradley contends the state failed to prove that he represented to Wyman that he 
would deliver one ounce of methamphetamine to him, and that Sergeant Hildebrandt's 
testimony was insufficient to show what Bradley meant by that phrase.2 (Appellant's 
2 To convict Bradley of trafficking in methamphetamine, the state had to prove: 
1. On or about the 6th day of February, 2013; 
2. in the state of Idaho; 
3. the defendant, DWAYNE ALLAN BRADLEY, possess[ed] 
Methamphetamine; 
4. the defendant knew it was methamphetamine; 
5. the amount of methamphetamine was represented by the person 
selling or delivering as twenty eight (28) grams or more. 
(R., p.153.) 
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Brief, pp.16-21.) Bradley's argument fails. Sergeant Hildebrandt's testimony constitutes 
sufficient evidence upon which the jury could reasonably conclude Bradley represented 
to Wyman that he would deliver one ounce of methamphetamine to him. 
At trial, Sergeant Hildebrandt described his extensive law enforcement 
experience investigating drug offenses. He explained he is currently a supervisor on 
the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force, and has been with that task force for six 
years, and that the majority of their investigations are "meth-related." (Tr., p.99, L.7 -
p.100, L.17.) During the first five years of his 25 years as a deputy sheriff, Sergeant 
Hildebrandt worked on "a crime impact team, in Los Angeles in the city of La Puente in 
which we targeted gangs in narcotics violations[,]" then he came to Idaho and joined the 
Kootenai County Drug Task Force. (Tr., p.99, Ls.17-22.) Sergeant Hildebrandt has 
completed "hundreds of hours in training on drug violations, drug investigations," and 
has "personally made well over 1500 narcotics-related arrests and assisted in over 
2,000 drug-related investigations." (Tr., p.99, L.22 - p.100, L.3.) During the four years 
Sergeant Hildebrandt worked with the Kootenai County Drug Task Force, they 
conducted "numerous methamphetamine buy operations, just a large number of 
investigations involving meth[,]" and, he testified, "buy operations" are "where we use a 
confidential informant to conduct a buy of drugs from somebody who is selling drugs." 
(Tr., p.100, Ls.8-22.) 
The prosecutor asked Sergeant Hildebrandt whether, based on his experience in 
the local area, he had "come to be familiar with various terms that are associated with 
the buying and selling of methamphetamine?" and he said that he had. (Tr., p.101, 
Ls.20-23.) The sergeant further testified in the following colloquy: 
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Q. What is a common amount in this area to sell bulk 
methamphetamine at? 
A. It would be by ounces. 
Q. And when you say an ounce, is there different words that people 
involved in this buying and selling of methamphetamine use to 
describe an ounce? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell us about that, please? 
A. In the drug trade, when drug dealings are arranged over the 
telephone, a lot of times they don't wish to speak plain English 
when arranging drug deals, so they will use different words to cover 
what it is that they are doing. But an ounce is referred to various 
ways. It is a "zip" or an O (inaudible). Or if they want half an ounce 
they will say they just want a half. If they want a full ounce, it will be 
a "full" or a "whole one." If they want a quarter pound it is 
commonly called a "quap." Different weights are referred to in a 
different manner. 
Q. So a whole one and a full one mean the same thing, an ounce? 
A. Yes, if they want a full ounce. 
(Tr., p.101, L.24-p.102, L.20.) 
During the first recorded phone call by Wyman to Bradley, Wyman asked him if 
they could meet up, and Bradley said "uh, yeah." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1; 00:00-00:18.) 
Wyman then said, "Okay ... I need a whole one," and Bradley responded "okay." (Id.; 
00:18-00:22) They then discussed when they might meet in the Hayden area, and 
agreed that 1 :00 would probably work out because both men had several things to do in 
the meantime. (Id.; 00:37-00:45) Toward the end of the call, Bradley told Wyman to 
"just get a hold of me and I'll let you know if I'm out that direction." (Id.; 00:57-01:02) 
Having agreed on a general time to meet in the Hayden area, and for Bradley to 
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provide Wyman with "a whole one," Wyman waited for about 30 to 45 minutes later 
before he called Bradley back. (Tr., p.110, Ls.4-8.) In the second call, the two men 
agreed to meet in the Pawn 1 area instead of meeting at Super One (a grocery store) 
because the latter was said to be like Wal-Mart . (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2; 00:26-00:40.) 
After Wyman and Bradley agreed to meet each other at Pawn 1 in 15 minutes, Bradley 
said, "hey -- do you want it full?" (Id.; 00:50-00:55.) Wyman responded, "yeah, yeah," 
and Bradley said, "alright, see ya there." (Id.; 00:56-00:57) The call ended with 
Wyman saying "ok" and Bradley saying "bye." (Id.; 00:58-00:59.) 
The following evidence and testimony combine to provided substantial and 
competent proof that Bradley represented he would deliver one ounce of 
methamphetamine to Wyman: (1) Sergeant Hildebrandt's testimony that people 
involved with buying and selling methamphetamine in the local area use the words "a 
'full' or a 'whole one"' to indicate a full ounce (Tr., p.101, L.20 - p.102, L.20); (2) the two 
recorded phone calls in which Bradley agrees to provide Wyman with a "whole one" and 
one that is "full" (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2); and (3) the fact that Bradley arrived at the 
agreed-upon time and place in a pickup truck with 27.63 grams of methamphetamine --
just short of 28.35 grams for one ounce -- concealed in the fake bottom of an aerosol 
can (Tr., p.119, L.19 - p.120, L.11; p.125, L.21 - p.126, L.1; p.144, L.9 - p.146, L.20). 
Based on the evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded Bradley 
represented he would deliver one ounce of methamphetamine to Wyman. In doing so, 
the jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that, because Bradley was 
selling methamphetamine to Wyman, he also used the terminology local buyers and 
sellers of methamphetamine used to disguise their illegal dealings, and understood a 
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"full" or "whole one" meant one ounce, just as Sergeant Hildebrandt testified. See 
Hoyle, 140 Idaho at 683-84, 99 P.3d at 1073-74; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d 
at 1001; Decker, 108 Idaho at 684, 701 P.2d at 304. 
Consequently, there is no basis for Bradley's contention that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him of trafficking in methamphetamine on the allegation 
that this element was not proven. 
111. 
Bradley Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Imposing A Unified Sentence Of 12 Years With Three Years Fixed Upon his Conviction 
For Trafficking In Methamphetamine 
A. Introduction 
Bradley asserts his sentence of 12 years with three years fixed is excessive. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.21-25.) He specifically contends the indeterminate portion of his 
sentence is excessive in light of several mitigating factors. (Id.) However, considering 
any reasonable view of the facts, Bradley has failed to establish that the district court 
abused its discretion in its sentence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts an independent review of the record that considers the nature of the offense, 
the defendant's character and protection of society. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 
772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). "Absent a showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion, a sentence within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal." State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989). 
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C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
Bradley argues, "the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his 
unified sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed, because the indeterminate 
portion of the sentence is excessive." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Bradley contends the 
district court failed to give adequate consideration to the following mitigating factors: (1) 
his substance abuse, (2) his difficult childhood, and (3) his positive contributions to his 
friends, family, and community. (Id., at 22-25.) Review of the record shows the district 
court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. kl 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. kl 
Bradley has failed to show that the nine-year indeterminate portion of his 
sentence is excessive, particularly in light of his extensive history of criminal offenses, 
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substance abuse, and his failure to rehabilitate. Bradley's criminal record dates back to 
1989, and includes "38 prior primary charges" (including six DUls), resulting in two 
felony and 17 misdemeanor convictions, mainly for driving-related and substance-
related offenses. (PSI, pp.14-15, 26.) The presentence report also outlined the many 
opportunities for rehabilitation given Bradley over the years: 
The Defendant was found guilty at trial of Felony Eluding and 
Misdemeanor DUI in 11 /2004. At the same time, he was also convicted of 
Driving Without Privileges. Term was suspended and he was placed on 
supervised felony probation with local jail time on the other charges. He 
attended treatment at the Sundown M Ranch and aftercare at Aspen 
Counseling and appeared to do well for a few months. But he failed to 
report in 11 /2005 and tested positive for methamphetamine in 12/2005. 
He . . . was released in early January. Within days, he again tested 
positive for methamphetamine, was re-arrested, and a PV was filed. He 
then admitted to having used the drug for his whole time on probation, but 
promised to quit. He bonded out in March and was allowed to enter the 
Sundown M Ranch for inpatient treatment while awaiting adjudication on 
his PV. He was released from treatment after a few weeks, but was 
arrested the night before his PV bearing after he was found under the 
influence of alcohol in public (.19 BAC). His sentence was imposed the 
next day. 
The Defendant completed Therapeutic community in prison and was 
paroled in 10/2007. By July 2008 the Defendant was arrested after being 
found drinking in public. He admitted to consuming alcohol regularly at 
Bob's 21 Club, Falls Club, and the Speedway. After his release, he was 
given a curfew and received a parole warning letter. On 12/24/2008, he 
was arrested after running his car into a snow bank while driving home 
from the Falls Club in Post Falls. His BAC was .200/.193. After his 
release, he went back into treatment, was given another parole warning 
letter, and managed to stay out of trouble until his parole expired in 
07/2009. 
(PSI, p.15.) 
At sentencing, the district court showed full familiarity with Bradley's case, 
acknowledged the appropriate sentencing criteria, see State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 
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567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. App. 1982), and explained its reasons for ordering a 
"substantial" indeterminate term of Bradley's sentence: 
I am familiar with the case, having reviewed the PSI, the letters of support, 
the files and records and the other materials submitted to the Court. . .. 
I am troubled by the quantity of methamphetamine in your 
possession. I am troubled by the obvious efforts made to hide it. And I 
am troubled by persons in our community that transfer drugs to others, 
especially quantities of drugs. You are sorry you are an addict. You are 
an alcoholic. What you do by transferring this stuff to other people and 
trafficking is you make more drug addicts, and it perpetuates the problem. 
Having considered the Toohill factors, I think punishment is a factor 
in this case. I think deterrence is a factor in this case. You have been 
through Sundown Ranch at least once, if not twice. You have been 
through the Therapeutic Community. You have been to prison. You have 
been on parole. You have been on probation. And you are still doing the 
kinds of crimes that most people grow out of at about 25. Yes, some of 
that is explainable because of your history. 
But having considered all those things, I think a substantial tail is 
appropriate. I am going to impose a three-year fixed term, which is a 
mandatory minimum, followed by a nine-year indeterminate. 
(Tr., p.217, L.7 - p.218, L.10.) 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a 
reasonable sentence. The mitigating factors Bradley cites on appeal -- his long-term 
substance abuse, his difficult childhood, and his contributions to his family, friends, and 
community -- were reflected in the record and adequately considered at sentencing. 
The court recognized that Bradley continued his criminality, to some extent, because of 
his "history." However, those factors, individually or collectively, do not show that the 
district court abused its discretion in its sentencing decision. In addition to pointing out 
the obvious damage to the community caused by those who "transfer drugs to others," 
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the court noted that Bradley had been given several opportunities to complete 
substance abuse programs, to no avail. (Id.) 
The sentence imposed is appropriate in light of the nature of Bradley's offense 
his character, and the importance of protecting society. Given any reasonable view of 
the facts, Bradley has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Bradley's judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
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